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SCHLUP V. DELO: ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS
MERE GATEKEEPER
Schiup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Schiup v. Delo the United States Supreme Court addressed
Lloyd E. Schlup, Jr.'s petition for the federal writ of habeas corpus.
Schlup, an inmate on Missouri's death-row, presented new evidence
indicating that he was actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted and sentenced to death. Procedurally, rules generally pre-
clude the availability of habeas review to capital prisoners, such as
Schlup, who have already failed to obtain habeas relief through a
prior petition. In Schiup, however, the Court held that federal habeas
courts may address a capital prisoner's second or subsequent habeas
petition if, in light of new evidence of innocence, it is "more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him."2 In
adopting "more likely than not" as an evidentiary standard, the Court
rejected its own more stringent precedent which opened the "gate-
way" to habeas review only upon a showing of "clear and convincing"
evidence.3 Thus, the holding in Schiup reflects a heightened respect
for the individual interests of capital prisoners who have newly discov-
ered evidence of innocence. This Note argues, however, that
although the Court's less stringent standard for "gateway" claims of
innocence was appropriate, it will do very little to prevent innocent
people from being executed.
First, "gateway" claims of actual innocence are a creature of legis-
lative grace and equitable considerations. Thus, the Court's "more
likely than not" standard is open to seemingly imminent congres-
sional reversal. 4 Moreover, the Court's "gateway" standard provides
tenuous protection under the existing law because Schiup does not
require, but appears only to permit, federal courts to reach the merits
of habeas petitions that are supplemented with evidence of innocence
1 115 S. CL 851 (1995).
2 Id. at 867.
3 Id. at 865.
4 As this issue of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology was going to press, Con-
gress and the President agreed on habeas corpus reform legislation that seriously limits the
availability of habeas review. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
1305
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
meeting the "more likely than not" standard.
On the other hand, habeas petitioners with truly persuasive evi-
dence of innocence would seem constitutionally entitled to habeas re-
view if the Constitution prohibits the execution of innocent people.
This Note does not argue whether actual innocence should be consid-
ered a bona fide constitutional claim. Because Schlup presented truly
persuasive evidence of innocence, this Note argues that the Court
should have answered the question of whether the execution of an
innocent person is unconstitutional. The clear implication of the
Court's silence on this issue is that the Constitution provides no such
protection. Thus, it appears that mere evidence of innocence does
not entitle an actually innocent prisoner to habeas review.
II. BACKGROUND
The writ of habeas corpus5 is the exclusive federal remedy avail-
able to a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his con-
finement and seeks as relief a speedier or immediate release. 6
However, federal habeas courts are not free to entertain the claims of
every state prisoner who petitions for the writ. For federal jurisdiction
to apply, a state prisoner's habeas petition must contain a cognizable
issue for review, and must satisfy certain procedural prerequisites. 7
Evidence that a habeas petitioner is either legally8 or factually inno-
cent9 of the crime for which he was convicted may be relevant in de-
termining whether his petition satisfies both requirements.
A. COGNIZABLE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Violations of Constitutional Rights
Federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain a state prisoner's pe-
tition for habeas corpus relief where confinement violates the pris-
oner's constitutional rights.10 Although it is unclear whether factual
5 The term "habeas corpus," when used alone, generally refers to the writ granted to
secure release from unlawful confinement, Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95
(1807), also known as the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiiendum See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976).
6 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973).
7 See generally Amos E. Hartston &Jay Gonzalez, Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1392, 1404 (1995).
8 This Note uses the phrase "legally innocent" to describe a petitioner whose convic-
tion was based on legally inadequate evidence.
9 This Note uses the phrase "factually innocent" to describe a petitioner who did not,
in fact, commit the crime for which he was convicted.
10 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1994) provides that "[tihe writ of habeas corpus shall not ex-
tend to a prisoner unless... [hue is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (federal judges shall
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innocence of a crime by, itself can present a. constitutional basis for
habeas relief, innocence is not wholly irrelevant. First, because several
constitutional provisions protect the innocent from unjust conviction
and sentencing, a habeas petitioner who is factually innocent, but who
was found guilty at a state proceeding, may have grounds to assert that
a constitutional deprivation occurred at his trial. For example, convic-
tion of a factually innocent person may have occurred because trial
counsel was ineffective. Because the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution" guarantees a right to the "effective assistance of
counsel,"' 2 such a petitioner would have a cognizable issue for habeas
relief.
2. Conviction Despite Inadequate Evidence- "Legal Innocence" as a
Constitutional Claim UnderJackson v. Virginia
Besides relying on specific procedural guarantees, a factually in-
nocent habeas petitioner may also establish a cognizable issue for re-
view based on the Fourteenth Amendment's general guarantee of due
process. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause
as embodying the evidentiary standard of proof that the Constitution
requires in criminal cases-w"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." s3
Therefore, a habeas petitioner effectively alleges a violation of his con-
stitutional rights (and presents a cognizable issue for habeas review)
when claiming that evidence adduced at trial did not prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 4
In Jackson v. Virginia,15 the Court articulated a "rationality" stan-
dard to govern habeas court review of cases where petitioners claim
imprisonment based on constitutionally inadequate evidence. Under
the Jackson rationality standard, habeas courts should ask "whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found ... [guilt] beyond a
reasonable doubt."16 In explaining the proper application of this
standard, the Jackson Court held that habeas courts should consider
entertain habeas corpus applications "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
11 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
13 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court has also held the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process to prohibit a prosecutor from suppressing evi-
dence which is favorable to an accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
14 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 318-19.
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only record evidence. 17 The inquiry that a habeas court makes when
applying the Jackson rationality standard is therefore not whether the
petitioner is in fact innocent of the crime for which he has been con-
victed. Rather, the Jackson inquiry is limited to the narrower issue of
whether a prisoner's confinement was based on legally sufficient evi-
dence of guilt. That is, whether the prisoner is legally innocent.18
3. Conviction and Death Sentence Despite Actual Innocence-"Factual
Innocence" Under Herrera v. Collins
The Jackson Court did not answer the question of whether a per-
suasive claim of factual innocence, as opposed to legal innocence,
could present a cognizable issue for habeas review. Whether this kind
of actual innocence claim could, by itself, present a cognizable issue
for habeas review depends on whether or not it is unconstitutional to
imprison (and even execute) someone who is factually innocent but
whose trial was otherwise free of constitutional error. In the 1993 case
of Herrera v. Collins,'9 the Supreme Court intimated, but declined to
hold, that the imprisonment or execution of a factually innocent per-
son does indeed violate the Constitution.
In Herrera, Leonel Herrera invoked both the Eighth 20 and the
Fourteenth Amendments2' to support his claim that his imprisonment
and death sentence violated the Constitution and therefore presented
a cognizable issue for habeas review. 22 Leonel Herrera claimed that
his deceased brother, Raul Herrera, Sr., had committed the murders
of the two police officers for which he (Leonel) was under sentence of
death.23 To support his claim, Leonel Herrera relied not on allega-
tions of error at trial, but on new evidence in the form of affidavits
that he procured only after exhausting state court remedies. 24
17 Id. at 317-18.
18 William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence 70 WASH. L. REv. 329 (1995).
19 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
20 The Court has held that under the Eighth Amendment, punishment is "cruel and
unusual" if it is "nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering," Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), or if it is "grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
21 The Court has held that the "substantive" element of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause "bar[s] certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
The Court has held this substantive element violated where conduct "shocks the con-
science." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
22 Herrera; 113 S. Ct. at 856-58.
23 Id. at 858.
24 Id. One of these affidavits was from Leonel Herrera's deceased brother's son (Raul
Jr.). RaulJr. swore that he wimessed his father (Raul Sr.) commit the murders for which
Leonel Herrera had been convicted and sentenced to death. Id. The two other affiants-
Raul Sr.'s former lawyer and former cellmate-corroborated the testimony given in Raul
1308 [Vol. 86
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Although the Supreme Court ruled against Herrera, the Court
did not completely dismiss the contention that the Constitution bars
the execution of factually innocent people. Instead, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, chose to "assume, for the sake of
argument... that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of
'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional."25 ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not articu-
late an evidentiary test for such constitutional claims. Instead, Rehn-
quist merely stated that a habeas petitioner would have to meet an
"extraordinarily high" threshold before receiving a full habeas hear-
ing on the claim of innocence.2 6
Without articulating the standard he was applying, Chief Justice
Rehnquist nonetheless concluded that the affidavits attesting to Le-
onel Herrera's innocence did not present a sufficiently persuasive
case. 27 In reaching that conclusion, the ChiefJustice emphasized the
weaknesses in Herrera's affidavits. For example, Rehnquist noted that
the affidavits contradicted one another,28 and that there was no expla-
nation for why statements by supporting affiants came ten years after
the murders had been committed.2 9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist also em-
phasized the strength of the proof of Leonel Herrera's guilt that was
adduced at trial.3°
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist would not express an opinion
as to whether there is a constitutional prohibition against the execu-
tion of a person who has made a persuasive showing of actual inno-
cence (discussing the purported prohibition only arguendo), six
justices-three dissenting arid three concurring-concluded that
such a prohibition exists. The three dissenting justices3l argued that
under the circumstances of Leonel Herrera's case, the Court should
have held that the Constitution bars the execution of innocent peo-
Jr.'s affidavit, each swearing that Raul Sr. confided in them and admitted being the true
killer. Id. at 858 n.2.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 869-70.
28 Id. See also id. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 870. Accord id. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 875 (White, J., concur-
ring). For example, when the police arrested Herrera, human blood (of the type of one of
the murdered officers) was splattered throughout Herrera's car and on his jeans. Id. at
857. Moreover, evidence at trial indicated that when Leonel Herrera was arrested, he was
in possession of a handwritten note in which he confessed and offered to turn himself in.
Id. at 857 n.1.
31 Justice Blackmun authored a dissent that was joined byJustices Stevens and Souter.
Id. at 876 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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ple.32 Three concurring justices33 also concluded that the Constitu-
tion bars the execution of innocent people. 34 Yet these concurring
justices believed that the Court properly sidestepped the issue because
in this specific case Leonel Herrera failed to present a persuasive
showing of actual innocence. 35 Thus, after Herrera, it appeared that if
a petitioner could make a showing of innocence sufficiently stronger
than did Leonel Herrera, a majority of the Court would hold that the
Constitution bars the execution of the innocent.36
However, several justices questioned whether the Court would
ever again need to entertain the issue of whether the Constitution
prohibits the execution of a habeas petitioner who makes a persuasive
showing of factual innocence. First, the majority opinion stressed the
ways in which the innocent have been historically protected through
the Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards of
clemency and pardon.37 Given these protections, Justice Scalia, in
concurrence, concluded that "it is improbable that evidence of inno-
cence as convincing as [Herrera's]" would ever again arise in a peti-
tion for the federal writ of habeas corpus.38 In seeming agreement,
Justice O'Connor concluded in her concurring opinion that the ques-
32 Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices also argued that the
Court should have articulated the precise burden of proof that should govern constitu-
tional claims of actual innocence when presented in a petition for the federal writ of
habeas corpus. Under the dissent's formulation, a habeas petitioner could obtain relief on
a claim of actual innocence upon a showing that he is "probably innocent." Id. (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
33 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that was joined byJustice Kennedy. Id.
at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White wrote his own concurring opinion. Id. at
875 (White, J., concurring). And Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion that
was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34 See id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental
legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution"); id. at
875 (White, J., concurring) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence'
made after trial... would render unconstitutional the execution of the petitioner in this
case"). But see id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("there is no basis in text, tradition, or
even contemporary practice.., for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial
consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after
conviction").
35 See id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[p]etitioner is not innocent, in any sense
of the word"); id. at 875 (White, J., concurring) ("[f] or the reasons stated in the Court's
opinion, petitioner's showing falls far short.., and I therefore concur in thejudgment.").
But see id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring only because "there is no legal error
in deciding a case by assuming arguendo that an asserted constitutional right exists").
36 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Etsay on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817,
833 (1993) (Herrera "suggests that, if the issue were properly raised, a majority of the Court
would interpret the Constitution to require at least a limited federal (substantive) review of
a defendant's claim of innocence.").
37 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 864-69.
38 Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ion of whether federal habeas courts may entertain convincing claims
of actual innocence "may never require resolution at all."39
Because evidence of factual innocence may not present grounds
for habeas relief, a state prisoner who claims to be innocent may need
to rely on independent constitutional grounds for habeas relief. How-
ever, even if a state prisoner has viable, independent constitutional
grounds to assert in a petition for habeas corpus, he will not be enti-
fled to habeas relief unless certain procedural prerequisites are met
B. PROCEDURALLY BARRED HABEAS CLAIMS
Several types of procedurally defaulted claims are not entitled to
federal habeas review. For example, before a state prisoner can raise a
claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, he must exhaust state
remedies. 40 If the exhaustion requirement is not met, a "procedural
bar" precludes federal habeas court review.41 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b), a procedural bar also applies to "successive" petitions
where a state prisoner raises grounds that are identical to grounds
heard and decided in previous habeas petitions.42 Moreover, under
§ 2244(b), even if a subsequent petition alleges new and different
grounds, a district court may nonetheless dismiss the petition if the
state prisoner "deliberately withheld" a claim from an earlier petition
or if the petitioner "otherwise abused the writ" (an "abusive"
petition) .43
39 Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4o "An application for the writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the Courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1994).
41 This exhaustion requirement is generally satisfied when the highest state court is
afforded a fair opportunity to rule on the factual and theoretical substance of a claim. See
genera!!y Hartston & Gonzalez, supra note 7, at 1404.
42 Section 2244(b) provides-
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a
hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to thejudgment of a
State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the
United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need
not be entertained by a court of the United States of ajustice orjudge of the United States
unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudi-
cated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the courtjustice, or
judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.




1. Cause and Prejudice
Procedural bars do not apply in cases where a habeas petitioner
can show both "cause" for his procedural default as well as actual
"prejudice" attributable to his inability to comply with procedural re-
quirements. 44 For example, a habeas court may view a state prisoner's
claims of innocence as procedurally barred if the prisoner failed to
raise his claims before a state court. But, such a petitioner could show
cause for his procedural default if, for example, the state failed to
disclose critical exculpatory evidence thus rendering "procedural
compliance impracticable. ' 45 A federal habeas court could then re-
view this procedurally barred habeas petition if, along with cause, prej-
udice also resulted. Prejudice is established where the petitioner can
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that" if the fact finder would
have had the exculpatory evidence, he "would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt."4 6
2. The Miscarriage ofJustice Exception
Although a showing of cause and prejudice is generally required
before a habeas court will hear an otherwise procedurally barred
habeas petition, the Supreme Court has construed § 2244 to allow
consideration of procedurally barred successive or abusive claims
(even absent cause and prejudice) where the "ends of justice" de-
mand.47 The Court has expressly tied the triggering of this "ends of
justice" exception to evidence of innocence, requiring habeas peti-
tioners to supplement their claims with a "colorable showing of factual
innocence."48 Because the exception is intended to prevent the exe-
cution of innocent people-the "quintessential miscarriage of jus-
tice" 49-it is often referred to as the "miscarriage of justice"
exception. 50 In this context, the Court has made it clear that actual
innocence is "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway
44 In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), the Supreme Court explained the
"cause and prejudice" requirement: the "existence of cause for some procedural default
must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external
to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule."
Under this standard, cause can be demonstrated by showing that the "factual or legal basis
of a claim was not reasonably available to counsel," or that governmental interference ren-
dered procedural compliance "impracticable." Id.
45 Id.
46 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
47 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
48 Id.
49 Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 866 (1995).
50 SeeJordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L REv. 303, 350 (1993)




through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."5'
Under Supreme ,Court precedent before Schlup v. Delo, however,
substantial questions existed as to exactly what a habeas petitioner
would need to show to secure a full habeas hearing. A look at the
evolution of the miscarriage ofjustice exception is therefore valuable
in understanding the significance of Schlup.
3. The Evolution of the Miscarriage ofJustice Exception
At common law, res judicata did not attach to a court's denial of
habeas relief.5 2 Thus, when a court would deny a habeas petition, the
petitioner could then turn around and make "a renewed application
... to every other judge or court in the realm. '53 The common law
then bound each court or judge so petitioned "to consider the ques-
tion of the prisoner's right to discharge independently, and [was] not
to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge."54 The
rule arguably "made sense," because at common law an order denying
habeas relief was not reviewable. 55
Once appellate review became available, however, the Supreme
Court began to modify the common law rule that required courts to
consider repetitive habeas petitions without regard to previous court
holdings on individual petitioners' cases. In the 1924 companion
cases of Salinger v. LoiseP6 and WongDoo v. United States,57 the Supreme
Court recognized that, although resjudicata does not apply to "a deci-
sion on habeas corpus refusing to discharge a prisoner, s58 second and
subsequent habeas petitions should nonetheless be "disposed of in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion."59 Thus, after Salinger and Wong
Doo, habeas courts could dismiss any successive or abusive habeas peti-
tions because they had the discretion to consider not only previous
51 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
52 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991) (quoting 1 W. BAILEY, HABEAS
CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 206 (1913) ("A refusal to discharge one writ [was] not a bar
to the issuance of a new writ.").
53 Id. (quoting W. CHURCH, WRIT OF HA"EAs CORPUS § 386, at 570 (2d ed. 1893)).
54 Id. (quoting CHURCH, supra note 53, § 386, at 570). See also, e.g., In re Koppel, 148 F.
505, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1906); Ex Parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 80 (No. 7,597) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1853).
55 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 479. See also W. DUCKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS 5-6 (1980) (arguing that successive petitions served as substitute for
appeal).
56 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
57 265 U.S. 239 (1924).
58 Salinger, 265 U.S. at 230 (emphasis omitted). Accord WongDoo, 265 U.S. at 240.
59 Salinger, 265 U.S. at 231.
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decisions refusing discharge, 60 but "whatever ha[d] a rational bearing
on the propriety of the discharge sought."61
Evolution of the writ of habeas corpus then arose through con-
gressional action. In 1948, Congress for the first time addressed suc-
cessive and abusive habeas petitions by enacting § 2244. This original
version of § 2244 stated that no judge "shall be required to entertain"
a successive or abusive habeas petition where "the ends of justice
w[ould] not be served by such inquiry."62 The Supreme Court origi-
nally construed this version of § 2244 in Sanders v. United States.63 In
breaking from the law as expressed in Salinger and Wong Doo, Sanders
held that under § 2244, habeas courts not only had the power, but
"the duty" to reach the merits of successive or abusive habeas petitions
wherever "the ends of justice demand[ed]. "64
Three years after Sanders, Congress amended § 2244 to "in-
troduc[e] a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus
proceedings. '65 The amendment broke the habeas corpus statute
into subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) remained unchanged except
that it now applied only to federal prisoners. 66 As to repetitive appli-
60 In Salinger, the Court expressly held that among the matters that "may be consid-
ered, and even given controlling weight, are (a) the existence of another remedy, such as a
right in ordinary course to an appellate review" (i.e. an unexhausted claim) and (b) an-
other habeas court's "prior refusal to discharge on like application." (i.e. a successive
claim). Id. Then in Wong Doo, the Court held that a habeas court properly dismissed a
claim where the petitioner "had full opportunity to offer proof [of his claim] at the hear-
ing on the first petition... [yet offered] no reason for not presenting proof at the outset"
(i.e. an abusive claim). Wong Doo, 265 U.S. at 241.
61 Salinger, 265 U.S. at 231.
62 Section 2244 provides:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to ajudgment of a court
of the United States, or of any State, if it appears that the legality of such detention has
been determined by ajudge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ
of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and
determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends ofjustice will not be served by
such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964).
63 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
64 Id. at 18-19.
65 S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966); see also H.R. REP. No. 1892, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966).
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings, promulgated in 1976,
also addresses the issue of repetitive habeas petitions. It provides as follows:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if
new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1994).
66 28 U.S.C § 2244(a) (1995).
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cations by state prisoners, Congress added subparagraph (b).67 Sec-
tion 2244(b) states that a federal court "need not entertain" a second
or subsequent habeas petition "unless" it is neither successive nor abu-
sive.68  But, unlike § 2244(a) (and the old version of §2244),
§ 2244(b) now contains no reference to "the ends ofjustice."69
After Congress adopted the amended version of § 2244, the
courts struggled to define how evidence of innocence should fit in
with habeas court discretion over successive, abusive, or otherwise pro-
cedurally defaulted claims. The Supreme Court first construed the
amended version of § 2244 in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.70 In Kuhlmann, a
plurality of the Court provided federal habeas courts with "guidance
for determining when to exercise the limited discretion granted them
by § 2244(b)."71 In doing so, the plurality announced that it would
"continue to rely on the reference in Sanders to the 'ends ofjustice,"'
although § 2244(b) no longer contained this language. 72
4. Open Issues Before Schlup v. Delo
In Kuhlmann, a plurality confirmed the continued viability of the
ends ofjustice exception where a habeas petitioner presented a proce-
durally barred successive petition. There, the Court stated that to se-
cure habeas review, a petitioner must establish "by a fair probability"
that "the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt
about... guilt."73 After Kuhlmann, however, the Court articulated a
variety of innocence standards. Thus, prior to Schiup, it was unclear as
to what requisite showing of factual innocence a petitioner would
need to make to secure a full habeas hearing.
For example, in Murray v. Carrier, a prisoner who was not under
sentence of death presented a procedurally barred abusive petition.74
Though decided on the same day as Kuhlmann, a majority of the Car-
rier Court seemingly refined the Kuhlmann articulation of the miscar-
riage ofjustice exception. Carrier stated, in dicta, that the miscarriage
ofjustice exception applies where a petitioner can demonstrate that a
"constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent."75 Then, in Sawyer v. Whitley76 the Court
67 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
68 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
69 Se id.
70 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
71 Id. at 451.
72 Id. at 451-52.
73 Id. at 455 n.17.
74 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
75 Id. at 496. Accord McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991) (recognizing that a
habeas court might entertain an abusive petition where the constitutional violation
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departed from the Carrier "probably resulted" standard when address-
ing the claim of an inmate whose habeas petition challenged his death
sentence, but not his conviction. Sawyer held that the petitioner "must
show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional er-
ror, no reasonable juror would have found [him] eligible for the
death penalty."77
Whatever the correct standard, Kuhlmann and subsequent Court
holdings have also not been clear as to whether a petitioner's success-
ful triggering of the miscarriage ofjustice exception thereby requires,
or merely permits, a federal habeas court to hear the merits of such
abusive or successive petitions.78 For example, in McCleskey v. Zant79
the Court explained that its decision in Kuhlmann "required federal
courts to entertain successive petitions" where a petitioner presents
evidence that meets the requirements of the miscarriage ofjustice ex-
ception.80 The choice of the word "require" may indicate that habeas
courts have an affirmative duty to hear a petitioner's habeas claim
once the miscarriage ofjustice exception is triggered. Other Supreme
Court statements, however, suggest otherwise. For example, in McCles-
key the Court also stated that a procedural bar to a habeas petitioner's
successive claim "may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show
that a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice would result."8' The use of
the word "may" seems to support the proposition that once a habeas
petitioner triggers the miscarriage of justice exception, a habeas
court, at its discretion, may or may not grant a full hearing.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 3, 1984, Arthur Dade, an inmate of the Missouri
State Penitentiary, was stabbed to death in a high security area of the
prison.82 Prison guards arrested Lloyd E. Schiup, Jr. in the prison din-
claimed "probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime").
76 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
77 Id. at 336.
78 Precedent for the rule of obligation position exists in the decisions that the Supreme
Court announced when habeas corpus legislation specifically contained reference to an
"ends ofjustice" exception. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Precedent for the
rule of permission position exists in the decisions that the Court made before Congress
ever addressed the issue of successive and abusive petitions through legislation. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text. Because the amended version of § 2244(b) seemingly
outmoded both lines of precedent, the issue of whether the miscarriage ofjustice excep-
tion is now a rule of obligation or a rule of discretion necessarily depends on the Court's
interpretations of the new statute.
79 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
80 Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added).
82 Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 854 (1995).
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ing room shortly after the murder took place.83 The State ultimately
charged Schlup, Robert O'Neal,8 4 and Rodnie Stewart,85 all of whom
were white inmates, with the murder of Dade, who was an African-
American.8 6
At his 1985 trial for the murder of Dade, Schlup claimed that the
state had "the wrong man."87 Specifically, the defense noted that
while the physical evidence implicating both Stewart and O'Neal was
substantial,88 the State could not produce any physical evidence con-
necting Schlup to the killing.8 9 Indeed, guards apprehended Stewart
during his actual struggle with Dade,90 and when they took O'Neal
into custody, his clothes were dripping with blood.91 In contrast, labo-
ratory tests of Schlup's shoes and clothing revealed no trace of
blood.92
A. THE STATE'S CASE
Although there was no physical evidence that connected Schlup
to Dade's murder, the state won a guilty verdict by relying principally
on testimony from two corrections officers who purportedly witnessed
the killing.93 The first such testimony was that of Sergeant Roger
Flowers. Flowers was on duty on "Walk 1"9 4 and "Walk 2"95 of the
penitentiary at the time of the murder.9 6 Flowers testified that when
releasing the inmates for lunch he unlocked the inmates' cells on
Walk 2 first, including the cells of Schlup, O'Neal, and Stewart. Flow-
ers then released the inmates of Walk 1, including Dade. Flowers tes-
tified that after he unlocked the cells to release the inmates of Walk 1,
he noticed Stewart carrying a container of steaming liquid and mov-
83 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Schiup (No. 93-7901).
84 O'Neal was convicted and sentenced to death in a separate trial. See State v. O'Neal,
718 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1986).
85 Stewart was convicted and sentenced to 50 years imprisonment in a separate trial. See
State v. Stewart, 714 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. App. 1986).
86 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854.
87 Although Schlup did not testify at the guilt phase of the trial, he did testify and
maintain his innocence at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 855 n.3.
88 Id. at 855 n.2.
89 Id. at 855.
90 Id. at 855 n.2.
91 Id.
92 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Scldup (No. 93-7901).
93 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854.
94 There were four floors to the housing unit of the penitentiary where the murder was
committed. Each floor contained two rows of cells-one facing north and one facing
south-called "Walks." Petitioner's Brief at 3, Schlup (No. 93-7901).
95 Both Walk 1 and Walk 2 were contained on the lower floor of the same housing unit.




ing against the flow of traffic from Walk 2 to Walk 1.97 Flowers swore
that he then saw Stewart throw the liquid in Dade's face. 98 According
to Flowers, Schlup then jumped on Dade's back, and O'Nealjoined in
the attack.9 9 Flowers shouted for help, then entered the Walk and
grabbed Stewart as the two other assailants fled. 0 0
Testimony from John Maylee, a second corrections officer, also
bolstered the State's case.' 0 ' Maylee testified that shortly before the
killing, he witnessed Stewart, Schlup, and O'Neal 0 2 run from Walk 2
to Walk 1.103 Maylee claimed that after Stewart threw a container of
liquid at Dade's face, Schlup jumped on Dade's back and O'Neal
stabbed Dade several times in the chest.'0 4 Although Maylee did not
see what happened to Schlup or Stewart after the stabbing, he testi-
fied that he saw O'Neal run down Walk 1 and throw his weapon out a
window.' 0 5
B. VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE
To counter the officers' testimony, Schlup relied on a videotape
from a surveillance camera located in the prison dining room, two
floors and several hundred feet from the scene of the crime.'0 6 The
videotape showed that Schlup was the first of several inmates to get in
the dining room's lunch line. The videotape also showed that approx-
imately one minute and five seconds after Schlup entered the dining
room, several guards ran out of the room in apparent response to a
distress call. Twenty-six seconds later, the tape shows O'Neal (one of
Dade's killers) running into the dining room dripping with blood. 0 7
O'Neal was followed by another inmate, Randy Jordan, whose name
was never mentioned at trial.'0 8
In light of the videotape evidence, the timing of the sequence of




101 Maylee was unavailable to testify at Schlup's trial, but testimony from his pretrial
deposition was admitted in evidence and read to the jury. Id. at 854-55 n.1.
102 One of the inconsistencies that Schlup pointed out at trial was that Maylee testified
that he saw Schlup, Stewart, and O'Neal running together and that the three stopped
when they encountered Dade. Flowers, however, noticed only Stewart running, and he
testified that O'Neal and Schlup were at the other end of the Walk on the far side of Dade.
Id. at 855 n.6.
103 Maylee claimed to have witnessed the attack from Walk 7, which is three floors and
40-50 feet above Walks 1 and 2. Id. at 854.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Schiup (No. 93-7901).
107 Schlup, 851 S. Ct. at 855.
108 Id. at 855 n.4.
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events was a key issue in the case. Because testimony before the court
indicated that Schlup had walked from his cell to the dining room at a
"normal pace,"10 9 Schlup would not have had time to get to the dining
room a full minute and five seconds ahead of the ensuing distress call
if he was on the prison floor at the time of the murder and if the
distress call went out shortly after the murder.110 Accordingly, the de-
fense argued that Schlup could not have participated in Dade's mur-
der." 1 On the other hand, if there had been a delay between the
time of the murder and the time of the distress call, Schlup could
have assisted in Dade's murder before entering the dining room.
Thus, Schlup's defense hinged on determining the time at which the
dining room guards received the distress call relative to the time at
which Dade's murder took place." 2
Although neither the State nor Schlup was able to establish the
exact time of either Dade's murder or the radio distress call, the State
did present evidence indicating that there had in fact been a lag in
time between the two. For example, Flowers testified that upon wit-
nessing the stabbing, he did not report the incident, but instead pro-
ceeded to engage in a struggle with Dade's assailant, Stewart, over the
course of "a couple [of] minutes."113 According to Flowers, he did
not report the incident until after he had apprehended Stewart and
brought him downstairs where he then informed Captain James Eb-
erle that there had been a "disturbance." 1 4 Moreover, Eberle testi-
fied that he did not radio 1 5 for help until "approximately a minute"
from the time when he first saw Flowers." 6
In light of the State's evidence, the jury found Schlup guilty and
sentenced him to death.117 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
Schlup's conviction and death sentence," 8 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari." 9 After exhausting his state collat-
eral remedies, 120 Schlup filed a pro se petition for a federal writ of
109 Two inmates testified that they were behind Schlup on the way to the dining room
and that they all walked at a leisurely pace. Id. at 856 n.10.
110 Id. at 855.
Ill Id.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 856 (quoting trial transcript).
114 See id. (same).
115 Flowers testified that he and the other prison floor officer did not have radios. Id.
116 See id. (quoting trial transcript).
117 Id.
118 State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1987).
119 Schlup v. Missouri, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
120 Schlup filed state collateral proceedings claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel was
ineffective having failed to investigate fully the circumstances of the murder. The Missouri
Circuit Court determined that Schlup's counsel had in fact provided effective assistance,
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habeas corpus on January 5, 1989.121
C. LLOYD SCHLUP'S PETITIONS FOR HABEAS RELIEF
In his initial petition for habeas relief, Schlup claimed that his
trial counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phase of
trial. 122 As in prior appeals to Missouri state courts, Schlup faulted his
trial counsel for failing to call Randy Jordan 123 and other inmates as
witnesses. 124 In addition, Schlup asserted new ineffectiveness claims
based on his trial counsel's failure (1) to introduce psychiatric or psy-
chological testimony as mitigating evidence during sentencing and
(2) to object to unconstitutional jury instructions. 125 The district
court 2 6 concluded, however, that because Schlup's petition asserted
new claims that had not been "adequately raised or pursued in state
court," habeas review was procedurally barred. 127 The court therefore
denied relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 128 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the contention that Schlup's
claim was procedurally barred, 129 but nonetheless affirmed Schlup's
conviction based on its examination of the record; specifically, the
court found that Schlup's trial counsel had not been constitutionally
ineffective. 130 The court of appeals then denied Schlup's petition for
rehearing as well as his suggestion for a rehearing en banc, 131 and the
United States Supreme Court denied Schlup's petition for
certiorari.13 2
and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Schlup v.
State, 758 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. 1988).
121 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 856.
122 Id. at 871 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123 The dining room video camera showed thatJordan followed O'Neal, one of Dade's
murderers, into the dining room. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
124 In addition to Jordan, Schlup also identified three nonparticipant witnesses that he
claimed had witnessed the murder: inmates Van Robinson, Lamont Griffin Bey, and
Rickey McCoy. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 856 n.14.
125 SeeSchlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the background of
Schlup's case).
126 The Honorable William L. Hungate, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri, presided over the habeas petition.
127 See Schlup, 941 F.2d at 635.
128 Id.
129 See id. at 637 ("[w]e do not have to reach this issue" of whether Schlup has exhausted
all state remedies).
130 The court concluded that: 1) Schlup's trial counsel had reviewed statements that
Schlup's potential witnesses had given to prison investigators, and 2) the testimony of
those witnesses would be "repetitive of the testimony to be presented at trial." Id. at 639.
But see id. at 642 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("I disagree with the court's conclusion that
Schlup was not prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness during the penalty phase.").
131 Schlup v. Armontrout, 945 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1991).
132 Schlup v. Armontrout, 112 S. Ct. 1273 (1992).
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On March 11, 1992, Schlup, who was represented by new counsel,
filed a second federal habeas corpus petition. This second petition
included claims that 1) Schlup was actually innocent of Dade's mur-
der; 2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview alibi
witnesses; and 3) the State had failed to disclose critical exculpatory
evidence.133 Attached to the State's response were transcripts of in-
mate interviews that had been conducted shortly after the murder.8 4
One such transcript consisted of an interview with John Green, an
inmate who had served as clerk for the housing unit of the peniten-
tiary.'3 5 In this post-incident report, Green stated that he was in his
office-at the end of Walks 1 and 2-at the time of Dade's murder. 3 6
According to the report, Flowers told Green to call for help, and
Green notified the base shortly after the disturbance surrounding the
attack on Dade began.' 3 7
Schlup immediately filed a traverse that claimed Green's inter-
view statements conclusively proved Schlup's innocence; because
Green's warning call came shortly after the incident began, Schlup
would not have had time to both participate in the murder and reach
the dining room a full minute and five seconds ahead of Green's dis-
tress call.138 Nonetheless, the district court dismissed Schlup's second
habeas petition, 139 concluding that Schlup's claim of actual innocence
did not amount to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" under the
"clear and convincing" standard of Sawyer v. Whitley.' 40
In his motion to set aside the dismissal, Schlup included an affi-
davit from Green that confirmed and expanded upon his post-inci-
dent statement.' 4 ' In the affidavit, Green swore that Flowers had
instructed him to report the attack on Dade during the attack: "[Flow-
ers] was on his way to break up the fight when he told me to call
base."142 Green also swore that after receiving Flowers' instruction he
had in fact made a prompt call for assistance: "I immediately went into
the office, picked up the phone, and called base.""43 Moreover,
Green identified Jordan, not Schlup, as the third assailant" 44 In spite






139 Id. at 858.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 858 n.21.
143 Id. at 858-59.
144 In his affidavit, Green stated, "I looked down one walk, and I saw Randy Jordan
holding Arthur Dade.... I saw Robert O'Neal stab Dade several times in the chest while
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of Green's affidavit, the district court denied Schlup's motion without
opinion.145 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit addressed Green's affidavit
and several other affidavits which the court below did not consider.1 46
In the face of a strong dissent from Judge Heaney, 147 the court of
appeals nevertheless denied Schlup's request for a stay of
execution.148
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, then denied Schlup's sug-
gestion for a rehearing en banc. t49 In disagreeing with the decision of
the court, Chief Judge Arnold argued that Schlup had raised two im-
portant issues.150 First, Chief Judge Arnold recognized that the
Eighth Circuit, in McCoy v. Lockhart,'5' held that the Sawyer "clear and
convincing" standard applied to challenges to convictions as well as to
challenges to death sentences.' 5 2 Thus, he did not believe that the
court erred in applying the Sawyer standard to Schlup's gateway claim
Jordan was holding him." Id.
145 Id. at 858-59 n.21.
146 The district court expressly declined to consider affidavits from current and former
prisoners (other than Green). Id. at 858 n.18. These prisoner affidavits are, however, a•
part of the record on appeal. See Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 1993) (address-
ing affidavits of former or current prisoners Lamont Griffin-Bey, Donnell White, andJames
Pierce). The affidavits of Griffin-Bey, White, and Pierce all contain sworn statements that
Lloyd Schlup was not a part of the attack on Dade. See id. at 746 (Heaney, J., dissenting)
(quoting Griffin-Bey Aff., at 2-3 (Apr. 7, 1993)) ("I saw Rodney [sic] Stewart throw liquid in
Arthur Dade's face, and O'Neal stab him... [however,] Lloyd Schlup was not present at
the scene of the fight"); see id. at 745 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting White Aff., at 1
(Apr. 21, 1993)) ("I have seen Lloyd Schlup, and I know who he is. He is definitely not
one of the guys I sawjump Arthur Dade."); see id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Pierce
Aff., at 1 (Apr. 21, 1993)) ("I saw two white guys go onto 1-walk. One of them threw a cup
of liquid into Arthur Dade's face, and the other one stabbed him. Lloyd Schlup was not
involved in the stabbing.").
Moreover, Schlup also obtained, and the court considered, an affidavit that substantiated
his videotape alibi (that he was in the dining room at the time of the murder). Id. at 742-
43. This affidavit came from Robert Faherty, a prison lieutenant who Schlup had passed
on his way to lunch on the day of the murder. Faherty's affidavit stated that before lunch,
Schlup was in Faherty's presence for two and a half minutes to three minutes, and, that
during that time, Schlup "was not perspiring or breathing hard, and... was not nervous."
Id. at 748-49 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Faherty Aft., 1 4, at 6 (Oct. 26, 1993)).
147 Judge Heaney dissented because he viewed the affidavits of eyewitnesses to Dade's
murder, as well as the affidavits that substantiated Schlup's videotape alibi, as "truly persua-
sive" evidence that Schlup is actually innocent. Id. at 744 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
148 The court of appeals initially denied Schlup's motion for stay pending appeal in
Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-3272, 1993 WL 409815 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1993). However, on No-
vember 15, 1993, the court of appeals vacated its October 15 opinion, substituting it with a
more comprehensive analysis in Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993).
149 Schlup, 11 F.3d at 754.
150 Circuit Judges McMillan and Wollman joined Chief Judge Arnold's dissent. Id. at
754 (Arnold, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
151 969 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1992).
152 Schlup, 11 F.3d at 754 (Arnold, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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of innocence.153 Nonetheless, ChiefJudge Arnold argued that the is-
sue of whether McCoy correctly interpreted Sawyer was "a question of
great importance in habeas corpus jurisprudence."154 Moreover,
Chief Judge Arnold recognized that under Herrera v. Collins, suffi-
ciently strong evidence of actual innocence would provide a constitu-
tional basis for habeas relief.' 55 Because ChiefJudge Arnold thought
that it was likely that Schlup's evidence of innocence would be "sub-
stantially more persuasive than Herrera's," he argued that the court of
appeals should have remanded Schlup's case for a full evidentiary
hearing on the constitutional claim of actual innocence. 56
. Although the court of appeals declined to consider Chief Judge
Arnold's concerns, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari. 57 The Court's grant of certiorari was limited, however, to the
question of what evidentiary standard governs the miscarriage of jus-
tice inquiry where a state prisoner claims actual innocence of the"
crime (for which he was sentenced to death) in order to procure a full
habeas review of his independent constitutional claims. Though also
included in Schlup's petition for certiorari, the Court refused to cer-
tify the question of what evidentiary standard of innocence a prisoner
must meet to secure a full evidentiary hearing on a constitutional
claim of actual innocence.' 58
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court,' 59 holding
that the "probably resulted" evidentiary standard of Murray v. Carrier
governed Lloyd Schlup's second habeas petition. Under the Court's
holding, Lloyd Schlup can open a gateway to habeas review if, in light
of his new evidence of innocence, it is "more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him."1 60
Justice Stevens began the Court's analysis by distinguishing Her-
rera v. Collins and its discussion of a constitutional claim of actual inno-
cence. Specifically, the Court construed the constitutional claim of
153 Id. at 745-55. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
154 Id. at 755 (Arnold, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
'55 Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
156 Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
'57 Schlup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994).
158 Id. See also SchIup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 n.31 (1995) ("[W]e denied certiorari
on SchIup's Herrera claim.").
159 Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined in the opinion.
160 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (1995).
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innocence asserted in Herrera as "novel" and "substantive."' 6 1 In con-
trast, the Court construed Schlup's claim of innocence as "proce-
dural." 162 To illustrate this distinction, Justice Stevens characterized
Schlup's habeas petition as grounded not in his contention of inno-
cence, but instead as dependent upon his independent constitutional
claims that his trial counsel had been ineffective and that the prosecu-
tion improperly withheld evidence. 163 ThusJustice Stevens construed
Schlup's claim of innocence as "not itself a constitutional claim."'6 4
Having held Herrera inapplicable, Justice Stevens then went on to
discuss the availability of habeas court review of Schlup's independent
constitutional claims. Justice Stevens noted that Schlup supported his'
second habeas petition with evidence that he did not present in his
first petition.1 65 Accepting the argument that Schlup failed to estab-
lish "cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse this procedural default,
Justice Stevens explained that a procedural bar precluded the availa-
bility of habeas review.' 6 6 ThusJustice Stevens concluded that Schlup
could obtain habeas review of his independent constitutional claims
"only if he falls within the 'narrow class of cases . . . implicating a
fundamental miscarriage of justice."1 67 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
construed Schlup's claim of innocence as potentially relevant only as a
means by which Schlup could trigger the miscarriage of justice
exception.168
Justice Stevens then proceeded to review the evolution of the mis-
carriage of justice exception. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the
need to control burdens on federal courts led to both congressional
and judicial action, 69 and that the net result of such action had been
a "qualified application of the doctrine of resjudicata."' 7 0 Justice Ste-
vens explained that the Court has never required the strict application
of the rules of res judicata because "habeas corpus is, at its core, an
equitable remedy."17 1 Thus, Justice Stevens held that an inquiry into
the equitable nature of a successive petitioner's habeas claim is re-
quired to satisfy "the ends ofjustice."'1 72 And, according to Justice Ste-
161 Id. at 860.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 861 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993)).
165 Id. at 861.
166 Id. at 860-61.
167 Id. at 861 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 862.
170 Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 863.
172 Justice Stevens relied on Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), which held that
habeas courts "must adjudicate even a successive habeas claim when required to do so by
1324 [Vol. 86
HABEAS CORPUS
vens, the 1986 trio of habeas cases-Sawyerv. Whitley, Murray v. Carrier,
and Kuhlmann v. Wilson-"firmly establish the importance of the equi-
table inquiry" that is needed to protect against "fundamental miscar-
riages of justice."1 73
As to the standard of proof that should govern such claims, Jus-
tice Stevens distinguished the applicability of the Sawyer "clear and
convincing 174 standard from the Carrier "probably resulted"' 75 stan-,
dard. Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that in Sawyer, the habeas pe-
titioner's claim challenged only the imposition of the death penalty,
not guilt of the crime itself.' 76 Because Schlup argued that he was
actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, Stevens
concluded that the Carrier "probably resulted" standard-and not the
Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard-applied in this case. 177 Jus-
tice Stevens supported this conclusion by presenting Carrier as a "less
exacting standard"178 that best accommodates the competing interests
posed by successive claims of actual innocence; societal interests in
"finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources" 179 on
the one hand, and "individual interests injustice" 80 on the other.
Justice Stevens then went on to articulate exactly what a habeas
petitioner must show to be granted a full hearing under the Carrier
"probably resulted" standard. Noting that the Carrier gateway stan-
the 'ends ofjustice.'" Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15-17 (1963).
173 Id. at 863-64. Justice Stevens noted that in Kuhlmann, the Court applied this type of
equitable exception even though Congress removed reference to an "ends ofjustice" in-
quiry from 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id. at 863.
174 Under the Sayerstandard, a petitioner must "show by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty." Sawyer v. Whitey, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
175 Under the Carrier standard, a petitioner must show that a "constitutional error has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
176 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
177 Id. at 866-67.
178 Id. at 866.
179 Id. at 865. Justice Stevens viewed the Court's choice of Carrier over Sawyer as posing
very little threat to societal interests. Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that while chal-
lenges to death sentences are "routinely asserted," claims of actual innocence are "ex-
tremely rare." Id. See also id. at 866 n.40 (quoting Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal
Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rv,. 303, 377 (1993)) ("in virtually every case, the allegation of actual
innocence has been summarily rejected"); id. at 864 (quoting HenryJ. Friendly, Is Inno-
cencelrreleuant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. RE,. 142, 145 (1970))
("the one thing almost never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was inno-
cent of the crime").
180 As to individual interests, Justice Stevens recognized that the "quintessential miscar-
riage ofjustice is the execution of a person who is actually innocent." Id. at 866 (citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that a habeas petitioner alleging a "fundamental
miscarriage ofjustice" is entitled to a "somewhat less exacting standard of proof" than is a
habeas petitioner "alleging that his sentence is too severe." Id.
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dard requires a habeas petitioner to show that he is actually innocent,
the Court held that to demonstrate actual innocence a petitioner
"must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him."18' Because this standard is made by refer-
ence to the likely behavior of jurors, Justice Stevens acknowledged
that it was somewhat similar to the Jackson v. Virginia rationality stan-
dard of review for the sufficiency of record evidence. 182
However, Justice Stevens responded to Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting arguments by noting points of distinction between the major-
ity's "more likely than not" gateway standard, and the rationality
standard of Jackson. First, Justice Stevens pointed out that the scope of
review of the Court's instant gateway standard was broader than that
recognized under the Jackson rationality standard.'18 3 Second, Justice
Stevens noted that the use of the word "could" in the Jackson standard
focused the inquiry on whether the trier of fact would have the power
or ability to find guilt.184 Justice Stevens argued that the use of the
word "would" in the Court's gateway standard focused the inquiry in-
stead on how the trier of fact was likely to behave. 8 5
Turning to the disposition of Lloyd Schlup's case, the Court held
that because the courts below improperly evaluated Schlup's gateway
claim of innocence under the "clear and convincing" standard of Saw-
yer,188 a remand' 87 was necessary.
181 Id. at 867.
182 Id. at 868-69. UnderJackson, a federal habeas court must ask "whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found... [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321
(1979).
183 See Schlup 115 S. Ct. at 867-68. Justice Stevens explained that because the "Carrier
standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual innocence," district courts are "not
bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial" when entertaining gateway
claims of actual innocence. Id. at 867. Thus, unlike the Jackson inquiry, where the review-
ingjudge resolves all credibility issues in favor of the state, seeJackson, 443 U.S. at 319, when
applying the majority's gateway standard, the judge must consider the credibility of the
State's evidence. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
184 Id.
185 Id. Thus,Justice Stevens explained that the phrase "more likely than not," as applied
to gateway claims of actual innocence, is not satisfied where the district court believes that
reasonable doubt exists. Rather, "the standard requires the district court to make a proba-
bilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do." Id.
186 Id. at 869. Justice Stevens also noted that the courts below failed to consider the
credibility of Schlup's newly discovered evidence; thus, the courts below misapplied the
Sawyer standard. Accordingly, the decisions below were reversible no matter which stan-
dard was appropriate, making the Court's "more likely than not" articulation of the Carer
standard arguably pure dictum. Joseph M. Ditkoff, The Ever More Complicated "Actual Inno-
cence" Gateway to Habeas Review: Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'v 889, 903 n.52 (1995).
187 Schlup, 115 S.Ct. at 869. After reviewing Schlup's evidence of innocence on remand,
the district court held that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
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B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion, she
wrote separately to address the concerns raised by the dissent.' 88
Turning to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,'8 9 Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that while the majority's standard "focuses
the inquiry on the likely behavior ofjurors,"'90 the threshold standard
for actual innocence is "substantially different" from the rationality
standard of Jackson v. Virginia.'9' Jackson, Justice O'Connor argued,
can not apply here because that case established the standard of re-
view for the sufficiency of record evidence; thus, it would appear "ill-
suited as a burden of proof."' 92
Next, in addressing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion,193 Justice
O'Connor explained that in this case, "the Court does not, and need
not decide whether the fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception
is a discretionary remedy."' 94 Rather, the Court merely determined
that the court below committed legal error by relying on Sawyer in-
stead of Carrier.95 Because it is a "paradigmatic abuse of discretion
for a court to base its judgment on an erroneous view of the law,"
Justice O'Connor explained that the Court's reversal of the lower
court's judgment does not "disturb the traditional discretion of the
district courts in this area." 96
C. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist' 97 acknowledged that the
Court had never before confronted the issue of what evidentiary stan-
dard a capital prisoner claiming innocence of a crime must meet to
secure a full hearing before a habeas court. 98 However, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist did not agree with the majority's conclusions in this case. 199
First, the Chief Justice argued that although the Sawyer Court ar-
convicted [Schlup] in light of the new evidence." Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 455
(E.D. Mo. 1995) (applying Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867). Because the district court concluded
that it "may reach the merits of [Schlup's] claims," it then scheduled a hearing. Id.
188 Schlup, 115 S.Ct. at 869 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189 See id. at 873 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); see also infra discussion at part 1V.C.
190 Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192 Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prod. of
Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993)).
193 See id. at 874-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra discussion at part IV.D.
194 Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197 Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined in ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent.
198 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
199 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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ticulated its "clear and convincing" standard where a habeas peti-
tioner challenged his death sentence, habeas courts should
nonetheless apply the Sawyer standard even where a capital prisoner
claims innocence of the crime for which he was convicted.200 But
even accepting the majority's holding that Carrier, and not Sawyer, ap-
plied to cases where a petitioner claims innocence of an underlying
crime, ChiefJustice Rehnquist still differed from the majority. Specifi-
cally disturbing to the Chief Justice was the majority's "more likely
than not" articulation of Carrier's "probably resulted" standard.201
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's articulation 20 2 of
Carrier as unduly confusing.20 3 Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist
faulted the majority's articulation for containing both a charge to a
finder of fact ("more likely than not"),204 with a conclusion of law
("no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of new evi-
dence").205 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that if the Court was set
on applying Carrier instead of Sawyer, it could have prevented the con-
fusion inherent in its "hybrid" standard by instead making express ref-
erence to the established rationality standard used in the review of
criminal appeals as presented in Jackson v. Virginia.20 6
To support his position, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized
the majority's articulation of the Carrier "probably resulted" standard
as itself an implicit adoption of the Jackson rationality standard.20 7
Thus, Rehnquist argued that the majority should have recognized the
similarities between its standard and that announced in Jackson.208
Although Chief'Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that a claim of actual
innocence in a federal habeas petition presents a different issue than
the situation where such a claim is made to a court of appeals, 20 9 he
nonetheless would conclude that the Jackson rationality standard,
when properly modified, would better reflect the language used in
200 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
201 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
202 The majority's articulation requires a habeas petitioner to "show that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of new evidence." Id.
at 867.
203 Id. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
205 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979)). Under Jackson, a federal habeas court must ask "whether, after viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found... [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 321.
207 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
208 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
209 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted how claims of "actual innocence" before a habeas
court can be supplemented by additional evidence that was not part of the original trial.




D. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia 11  argued that
§ 2244(b)21 2 controlled this case.2 1 3 Justice Scalia pointed out that
under § 2244(b), a federal district court "need not... entertai [n] " 214
a state prisoner's second or subsequent petition for the writ of habeas
corpus.215 Considering this statutory language, Justice Scalia found
the majority's opinion-which he viewed as requiring habeas courts to
entertain second and successive petitions upon the showing that a
"miscarriage of justice" has occurred-to be "flatly contradicted by
statute."2 16
In fact, Justice Scalia argued that Congress specifically acted to
make the miscarriage ofjustice exception inapplicable under the cir-
cumstances of Schlup's case. As Justice Scalia noted, Congress first
addressed the issue of repetitive habeas petitions by adopting legisla-
ton in 1948.217 Under the terms of that legislation, federal district
courts could deny petitions for habeas review only where "the ends of
justice w[ould] not be served by such inquiry."218 Accordingly, Justice
Scalia, though dissenting in this case, found that in Sanders v. United
States,219 the Court acted with "unimpeachable logic" when it con-
strued the statute as imposing a "duty" on habeas courts to reach the
merits of a subsequent petition "if the ends ofjustice demand."220 Jus-
tice Scalia argued, however, that subsequent congressional amend-
ments make the Sanders holding inapplicable here.22 ' As Justice Scalia
pointed out, Congress amended § 2244 three years after the Sanders
decision.222 Because of these amendments, § 2244(b), which applies
to state prisoners, contains no "ends ofjustice" provision.22 3
Although Justice Scalia felt that congressional amendments to
§ 2244 made Sanders bad law, he acknowledged22 4 that in Kuhlmann, a
210 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
211 Justice Thomas joined injustice Scalia's dissent.
212 See supra note 42.
213 Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see supra note 42.
215 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 See supra note 62.
219 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
220 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18-19).
221 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
224 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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plurality of the Court announced that it would "continue to rely on
the references in Sanders to the 'ends ofjustice."' 225 Nonetheless, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that the miscarriage of justice inquiry is "not
required by [Supreme Court] precedent."226 First, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that Kuhlmann, having been decided without a majority, "lacks
formal status as authority."227 Moreover, Justice Scalia construed sub-
sequent majority Court holdings as not imposing a duty on habeas
courts to apply the ends of justice exception. 228 Although Justice
Scalia acknowledged that some of these cases have restated the "ends
of justice" duty recognized in Kuhlmann,229 he also pointed out that
many cases treated this "miscarriage-of-justice doctrine as a rule of
permission rather than a rule of obligation." 230
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, stare decisis does not require
habeas courts to hear abusive and successive petitions where the "ends
of justice demand."231 Rather, a federal habeas court may make an
"ends of justice" inquiry as a matter ofjudicial discretion.2 32
V. ANALYSIS
Part A of this Note argues that the Supreme Court improperly
distinguished Lloyd Schlup's claim of actual innocence from the con-
stitutional claim of innocence that the Court discussed, but did not
formally recognize, in Herrera v. Collins. Part A of this Note concludes
that the Court could have, and should have, used Schlup's case to
definitively decide whether the Constitution bars the execution of a
factually innocent person.
Part B of this Note concludes, as a separate matter, that when
discussing the applicability of a procedural bar to Lloyd Schlup's
habeas petitions, the Court properly construed the miscarriage ofjus-
tice exception. The Court's "more likely than not" articulation is a
proper standard of proof to govern such claims. However, Part B ar-
225 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451 (1986).
226 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 875. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 877. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991)
("Kuhlmann... required federal courts to entertain successive petitions when a petitioner
supplements a constitutional claim with a 'colorable showing of factual innocence'")).
230 Id. at 877-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519
(1992) ("[Kuhlmann held that] the miscarriage ofjustice exception would allow successive
claims to be heard"); McClskey, 499 U.S. at 494 ("[flederal courts retain the authority to
issue the writ [in cases of fundamental miscarriages of justice]"); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ("where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convic-
tion of one who is actually innocent, a federal court may grant the writ")).
231 Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gues that Schlup does not appear to require habeas courts to apply the
miscarriage ofjustice exception even where a state prisoner meets the
majority's "more likely than not" gateway standard. Thus, Part B of
this Note concludes that Schlup provides actually innocent habeas peti-
tioners with tenuous protection.
A. BECAUSE LLOYD SCHLUP PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
INNOCENCE, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED WHETHER
THE CONSTITUTION BARS THE EXECUTION OF FACTUALLY
INNOCENT PEOPLE
1. The Majority Improperly Distinguished the Nature of Schlup's Actual
Innocence Claim from that Asserted in Herrera v. Collins
In Herrera v. Collins, six Supreme Court Justices expressly con-
cluded that, with the appropriate evidentiary showing, the execution
of an innocent person would violate the Constitution.233 However,
because a majority of the Court viewed Leonel Herrera's evidence of
innocence as weak, the Court did not have the occasion to decide
whether the execution of an innocent person is unconstitutional.23 4
Because Lloyd Schlup supported his claim of actual innocence with
substantial evidence, it appeared that the Schlup Court would decide
the issue,235 and it is troubling that it refused to do so.
Even though the Schlup Court refused to certify the question of
whether the execution of an innocent person violates the Constitu-
tion,23 6 it nonetheless went to great lengths to distinguish the nature
of Schlup's claim of innocence from that asserted in Herrera.237 The
Court's primary distinction was that in Herrera, Leonel Herrera relied
exclusively on a substantive claim of actual innocence. 23 8 Lloyd
Schlup, on the other hand, supplemented his claim of innocence with
procedural constitutional claims, such as the claim that his trial coun-
sel had been ineffective.
The Court's distinction is highly questionable. If the Constitu-
tion does bar the execution of factually innocent people, then it
would seem manifestly inappropriate for the Court to have punished
Lloyd Schlup for having actual innocence as an additional constitu-
233 See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 870 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
875 (White, J., concurring); id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234 See id. at 870-71 (O'Connor, J. concurring); id. at 875 (White, J., concurring).
235 See L. Anita Richardson, Claims of Innocence: Court to Define Evidence Standard for Prison-
ers Alleging Wrongful Conviction, 80 A.BA.J. 38 (1994).
236 See SchIup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994); Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861 n.31 (1995)
("[W]e denied certiorari on SchIup's Herrera claim.").
237 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860-62.
238 Id. at 860.
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tional claim. If anything, the mere fact that Schlup had separate con-
stitutional claims (independent of his straight-forward actual
innocence claim) should have strengthened, not weakened, his
habeas petition.23 9 Indeed, although Lloyd Schlup had constitutional
claims other than actual innocence, 240 he still had a "personal stake"
in the resolution of whether a free-standing constitutional claim of
innocence could be a cognizable issue for habeas review.241 A look at
the inherent problems with Schlup's independent constitutional
claims demonstrates how the Court's refusal to address actual inno-
cence as a free-standing claim compromised his individual interests in
justice.
Because the Supreme Court is unwilling to recognize innocence
as a constitutional claim in and of itself, Schlup must necessarily rely
on other constitutional claims such as ineffectiveness of trial coun-
sel.24 2 Yet in determining whether trial counsel has been constitution-
ally ineffective, a court must indulge in a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of professional assist-
ance. 243 If Schlup received only bad legal assistance, and not unrea-
sonable assistance, he would not have a valid constitutional claim for
relief. Thus, his evidence of innocence, no matter how persuasive,
would seem irrelevant. Evidence of innocence would provide Schlup
with a gateway, but a gateway to nowhere.244 Such a result seems
wholly inconsistent with the Court's long held credo that cases involv-
ing capital punishment deserve the most serious scrutiny.245
2. Lloyd Schlup's New Evidence of Innocence Was Substantially More
Persuasive Than That Asserted in Herrera v. Collins
The facts of Schlup's case also presented a particularly appropri-
ate context for the Court to consider the constitutional actual inno-
cence claim that it instead chose to ignore. In fact, Schlup's evidence
239 Thus, the Court should have viewed Schlup's claim of actual innocence as presenting
alternative grounds for habeas relief; a constitutional claim of actual innocence on the one
hand, and on the other, a gateway claim of actual innocence that would permit habeas
court review of his other constitutional claims.
240 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861.
241 Thus, the "case and controversy" mandate of Article III in no way barred Supreme
Court review of Schlup's constitutional claim of actual innocence. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
242 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860.
243 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
244 See Steiker, supra note 50, at 477 (noting the "serious anomaly in the Court's habeas
jurisprudence").
245 The Supreme Court has noted on multiple occasions that "death .. . is different."




of actual innocence was much stronger than that presented in Herrera,
where the Court at least addressed, albeit arguendo, whether the exe-
cution of an innocent person could be unconstitutional.246 In
Schlup's case, the State could produce no physical evidence that
linked Lloyd Schlup to the murder of Dade. 247 By contrast, in Herrera
there was substantial physical evidence that implicated Leonel Her-
rera in the murders for which he was convicted.248 For example,
when the police arrested Herrera, human blood (of the type of one of
the murdered officers) was splattered throughout his car and on his
jeans.2 49
Moreover, in Herrera, Leonel Herrera presented his new evidence
of actual innocence to a federal habeas court a full ten years after his
state court conviction.2 50 Schlup's case also presented the problem of
stale evidence, but not as severely. While Schlup did not procure
some of the affidavits that comprised his new evidence until seven
years after his original trial,25 1 the affidavit ofJohn Green-critical to
Schlup's claim of actual innocence-merely confirmed the post-inci-
dent statements that Green had made shortly after the assault on
Dade.2 52 And Schlup procured the central unifying piece of his actual
innocence claim-the videotape evidence-before trial 2 53 Thus,
Schlup presented persuasive evidence of actual innocence that was
not the least bit stale.
Further, Schlup's actual innocence claim was significantly more
credible than that presented in Herrera. Schlup could point to specific
reasons why he produced the affidavits that established his innocence
only in his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus: (1) his trial
counsel had been ineffective; 254 (2) the State failed to disclose critical
exculpatory evidence such as the post-incident statement of John
Green;255 and (3) racial strife in the prison initially prevented black
inmates from coming forward in his defense.2 56 Leonel Herrera, on
the other hand, presented affidavits that purportedly established his
246 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. CL 853, 869 (1993).
247 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Schlup (No. 93-7901).
248 See Herrera, 113 S. CL at 857.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 856.
251 Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 1993).
252 See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct 851, 858-59 n.21 (1995).
253 See id. at 855 (explaining that Schlup introduced videotape evidence at trial).
254 Id. at 857.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., id. at 858 n.18 (quoting Griffin-Bey Aff., at 2-3 (Apr. 7, 1993)) ("When this
happened, there was a lot of racial tension in the prison.... I would not stick my neck out
to help a white person under these circumstances normally, but I am willing to testify
because I know Lloyd Schlup is innocent.").
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innocence "with no reasonable explanation for the decade-long de-
lay."'25 7 Further, because Herrera's affidavits identified a dead man as
the true murderer, his evidence of innocence should be viewed skepti-
cally.258 Lloyd Schlup, in contrast, presented an affidavit that impli-
cated a living suspect, Randy Jordan. 259
Finally, Lloyd Schlup consistently maintained that the state had
"the wrong man";2 60 Leonel Herrera did not.2 6 1 When the police ar-
rested Herrera, he had in his possession a signed letter in which he
acknowledged responsibility for the murders of the two police officers
for which he was ultimately convicted. 262 In sharp contrast, when
Lloyd Schlup was arrested, he told investigators that he had gone di-
rectly from his cell to the prison dining room because he planned to
play handball after lunch. Schlup carried no letter of admission; only
a handball was found in his pocket. 263
Given the substantial evidence of factual innocence that Lloyd
Schlup presented, it is clear that Hen-era concurrers were wrong when
predicting that it is "improbable that evidence of innocence as con-
vincing as [Herrera's]" would ever again reach the Supreme Court.2 64
Indeed, Lloyd Schlup's evidence of innocence was not merely "as con-
vincing" as Leonel Herrera's, rather, it was substantially more convinc-
ing.265 Thus, Schlup's case flies in the face of Herrera concurrers who
candidly expressed their view that "with any luck" the Supreme Court
would never again have to face the "embarrassing question" of
whether the Constitution bars the execution of factually innocent peo-
ple.2 66 Given the facts present in Schlup's case, the Court should have
realized that its "luck" had run out.
Yet the Court remained silent. This silence in the face of substan-
tial-if not "truly persuasive"-evidence of innocence seems to indi-
cate that the Court simply will not make full habeas hearings available
on straight-forward constitutional claims of actual innocence.
257 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 872 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
258 Id.
259 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
260 Although Schlup did not testify at the guilt phase of the trial, he did testify and
maintain his innocence at the sentencing hearing. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 855 n.3.
261 See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857.
262 See id. at 857 n.1.
263 Petitioner's Brief at 6 n.7, Schiup (No. 93-7901).
264 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
265 Accord Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 1993) (Heaney, J., dissenting); id. at
755 (Arnold, Cj., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
266 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. THE MAJORITY'S "MORE LIKELY THAN NOT" ARTICULATION PROVIDES
HABEAS COURTS WITH AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR
DECIDING "GATEWAY" CLAIMS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE, BUT
HABEAS COURTS MAY PROPERLY IGNORE IT
1. The Majority's "More Likely Than Not" Gateway Standard Best
Accommodates the Interests of Society and the Individual
Although the Court should have addressed the issue of whether
actual innocence is itself a constitutional claim, the majority did prop-
erly recognize that capital prisoners may use evidence of innocence to
open a gateway to habeas court review of independent claims. 267 For
the purposes of guiding habeas courts confronted with gateway claims
of actual innocence, the Schlup Court appropriately articulated the
"more likely than not" standard as an alternative to the more stringent
Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard. First, the terms of the Sawyer
standard indicate that it was intended to apply only to challenges to
death sentences, and not to challenges to convictions.2 68 Sawyer held
that to trigger the miscarriage ofjustice exception, a petitioner would
need to show "by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitu-
tional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligi-
ble for the death penalty."269 Because Lloyd Schlup argued that he was
actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, 270 Sawyer
was distinguishable.
There were also compelling reasons for not expanding the Sawyer
"clear and convincing" standard to gateway claims of innocence, such
as Schlup's, where the petitioner disputes guilt of an underlying
crime. Intuitively, someone who may be entirely innocent of a crime
(i.e., a prisoner claiming actual innocence of the crime) would seem
entitled to a greater degree of protection than would someone who
comes to the court with dirty hands (i.e., a prisoner who only chal-
lenges the severity of his sentence). Moreover, lowering the barrier to
habeas review for prisoners who claim innocence of a crime will only
minimally implicate societal interests. As the-majority noted, because
evidence of actual innocence of a crime is generally not available to
habeas petitioners,271 the "threat to judicial resources, finality, and
comity posed by claims of actual innocence is less than that posed by
claims relating only to sentencing."272
267 Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 860 (1995).
268 Accord Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 751 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
269 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (emphasis added).
270 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
271 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865-66; see also Friendly, supra note 179, at 145; Steiker, supra
note 50, at 377.
272 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 866.
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In contrast to the minimal threat that claims of actual innocence
of a crime pose to societal interests are the potentially extraordinary
benefits to individual death row inmates with substantial evidence of
innocence. To be sure, at least some death row inmates who would
not have been able to meet the stringent "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of Sawyer will now be able to open a gateway to a full habeas
hearing. Lloyd Schlup is one of them.2 73 As a direct result of the
majority's less stringent standard, Lloyd Schlup no longer awaits his
execution, but instead a full federal court hearing on the merits of his
habeas petition. 274 Thus, the qualitative impact of a less exacting stan-
dard can be extraordinary to individuals.2 75
Given the overriding individual interests that would otherwise be
threatened by expansion of the Sawyer "clear and convincing" stan-
dard, the majority was correct in holding the less stringent "probably
resulted" Carrier standard applicable here.2 76 Under the Schiup major-
ity's articulation of the Carrier standard, a capital prisoner can receive
a full hearing on a petition for habeas corpus if he can show that new
evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reason-
able juror would have convicted him." 277 Though this articulation
may contain inherent similarities278 with the Jackson v. Virginia stan-
dard279 (for the sufficiency of record evidence), any potential confu-
sion with the Jackson standard is not likely to frustrate the majority's
purpose. By all accounts, the majority's standard is understood to be
less exacting than the "clear and convincing" standard of Sawyer.280
Thus, despite some imperfections, the Schiup Court's "more likely
than not" standard has the potential to better protect the individual
interests of capital prisoners with evidence of innocence.
273 After reviewing Schlup's evidence of innocence on remand, the district court held
that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [Petitioner]
in light of the new evidence." Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Mo. 1995)
(applying Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867).
274 Because the district court concluded that it "may reach the merits of [Schlup's]
claims," it scheduled a hearing. Id.
275 Of course, even though the district court scheduled a full hearing, Lloyd Schlup
must still rely on his independent grounds for habeas relief such as the claim that his trial
counsel had been ineffective. Thus, even if the evidence shows that Lloyd Schlup is factu-
ally innocent, Lloyd Schlup may ultimately be executed. See supra part VAL.
276 See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
277 Id. at 867.
278 See id. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
279 UnderJacksn, a federal habeas court must ask "whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
... [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979).
280 See, e.g., Ditkoff, supra note 186, at 889 ("the Court lowered the barrier"); Note, Death
Penaly-Actual Innocene Claims, 109 HARv. L. REvr. 259 (1995) ("the Supreme Court has
finally taken [a] ... step toward restoring the rights of actually innocent defendants").
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2. The Implications of the Court's "More Likely Than Not" Holding
Despite the potential of the majority's less stringent standard, it is
not likely to significantly protect future, actually innocent habeas peti-
tioners. First, Congress has already moved to reverse Schlup, and
bring habeas courts back to the "clear and convincing" standard of
Sawyer.281 But regardless of whether Congress and the President agree
on legislation that would rekindle Sawyer, the Schlup majority's analysis
of the miscarriage ofjustice exception provides actually innocent peti-
tioners with precarious protection because, consistent with Justice
Scalia's dissenting arguments, the miscarriage ofjustice exception ap-
pears to be a "rule of permission."28 2
Under a rule of permission approach, federal habeas courts have
permission, but are under no obligation, to grant full habeas hearings
where prisoners present evidence of innocence sufficient to trigger
the miscarriage ofjustice exception. Thus, although the Schlup major-
ity explicitly recognized the individual interests that actually innocent
capital prisoners have in justice, those interests may not receive addi-
tional respect under the Court's less stringent gateway standard. That
is, habeas courts may simply choose to ignore the miscarriage ofjus-
tice exception even where a state prisoner's new evidence of inno-
cence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him."28 3 Though this result seems unfair and unneces-
sary,2 84 it is consistent with popular will as expressed by Congress
through § 2244.285
281 As this issue of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology was going to press, Con-
gress and the President agreed on habeas reform provisions as part of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 §§ 101 to 108, 110 Stat. 1214,
1214-26 (1996) (enacted Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.). The Act severely
limits the availability of habeas court review by, among other things, amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) to provide as follows:
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless the applicant
shows that... the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the appli-
cant guilty of the underlying offense.
See Pub. L. No. 104-132, §106(b).
282 See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 878 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 867.
284 As the majority notes, actual innocence claims will not significantly implicate societal
interests because evidence of actual innocence is generally not available to habeas petition-
ers. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865-66; see also Friendly, supra note 179, at 145; Steiker, supra note
50, at 377.
285 Through legislative history, Congress made clear that the purpose of the amended
version of § 2244 was to "introduc[e] a greater degree of finality of judgments made in
habeas corpus proceedings." S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966); see also H.R.
REP. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1966). Certainly, giving habeas courts the free-
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Section 2244(b) now addresses successive and abusive habeas
claims by state prisoners, and contains no reference to an "ends of
justice" inquiry. 286 Interestingly enough, § 2244(a), which now ad-
dresses claims by federal prisoners, retained the "ends ofjustice" lan-
guage from the earlier version of the statute. 287 It is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully when it
includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in
another.288 Thus, it is clear that Congress at least intended the mis-
carriage ofjustice exception to apply differently as between state and
federal prisoners.
Because § 2244(a) contains identical language as the original
habeas legislation (except that § 2244(a) now addresses only federal
prisoners),289 Supreme Court precedent interpreting the original ver-
sion should still apply. That is, when addressing habeas petitions of
federal prisoners, habeas courts should still have a "duty" to reach the
merits of subsequent petitions wherever the ends of justice de-
mand.290 However, the current version of § 2244(b) states that
habeas courts "need not entertain" a state prisoner's successive or abu-
sive petition. 291 It therefore appears that habeas courts may dismiss
such claims, as a matter of discretion, even where denial of'a full
habeas hearing would implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice
under the "more likely than not" gateway standard of Schlup.292
The Schiup majority opinion does not appear to contradict the
natural construction of § 2244.293 In fact, prompted by Justice Scalia's
dissent, Justice O'Connor made clear in her concurrence that the ma-
jority's holding "does not disturb the traditional discretion" afforded
dom to dismiss successive and abusive habeas petitions whether or not a miscarriage of
justice would result is consistent with Congress' express purpose.
286 See supra note 42.
287 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1994) with 28 U.S.C § 2244 (1964), quoted in Schlup, 115
S. Ct. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288 A five to four majority, led by Justice Scalia, adopted this principle of statutory con-
struction in BFB v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994).
289 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1995) with 28 U.S.C § 2244 (1964), quoted in Schlup, 115
S. Ct. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963) (interpreting original version
of § 2244).
291 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
292 See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293 Justice Scalia dissented in this case in part because he viewed the majority opinion as
.unmistakably pronounc[ing]" the miscarriage ofjustice exception as a rule of obligation.
Id. at 875 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). However, it is very likely that the majority never intended
its opinion to address the issue of whether the miscarriage ofjustice exception is a rule of
permission or a rule of obligation because the issue was neither argued by the parties nor
addressed by the court of appeals below. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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habeas courts.29 4 This result, correct under the terms of § 2244,
would of course be void if in defiance of the Constitution.295 As dis-
cussed above, however, the clear inference of Schlup is that the Consti-
tution does not prohibit the execution of an innocent person.296 A
law which allows federal judges to deny habeas hearings despite evi-
dence of innocence would therefore appear to be, a fortiori,
constitutional. 297
Vi. CONCLUSION
Although the Court viewed Lloyd Schlup's second petition for
habeas corpus relief as procedurally barred, it held that he could re-
ceive a full habeas hearing if his new evidence of innocence makes it
"more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him."298 While this is a correct result, the Court's opinion is not likely
to significantly protect innocent people from being executed.
First, the Court failed to recognize key points of distinction be-
tween the evidence of innocence that Lloyd Schlup presented, and
the evidence of innocence presented in Henera v. Collins. Because
Schlup's evidence was much stronger, the Court should not haveruled on'the issue of whether the Constitution bars the execution of a
factually innocent person. The implication of the Court's silence is
that full habeas hearings are unavailable on straight-forward constitu-
tional claims of actual innocence. Second, the Court's analysis of the
fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception does -not appear to con-
tradict the argument that the exception is a rule of permission. Thus,
after Schlup, federal courts will likely be free to dismiss the habeas peti-
tions of state prisoners even where new evidence of innocence makes
it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted."
JAMES G. Ci ssuRAs
294 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Because Justice O'Connor represents the fifth Jus-
tice in a five Justice majority, her narrow understanding of the majority opinion becomes
the law. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1970).
295 The Constitution is supreme over ordinary law, and laws in defiance of the Constitu-
tion are void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
296 Schlup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994). See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 n. 31
(1995) ("we denied certiorari on Schlup's Herrera claim").
297 This is particularly significant now that Congress and the President have acted to
severely limit the availability of habeas review through the "Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996." See supra note 281 and accompanying text. These new provi-
sions, which severely limit the availability of habeas review, would likewise appear
constitutional.
298 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
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